AI Hallucination Cases

"[49] Mr. Ohenhen submitted a statement of legal argument to the court in support of his arguments. In those documents, he referred to at least two non-existent or fake precedent court cases, one ostensibly from the Court of Appeal for Ontario and another ostensibly from the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In reviewing his materials after argument, I tried to access these cases and was unable to find them. I asked the parties to provide them to me.

[50] Mr. Ohenhen responded with a “clarification”, providing different citations to different cases. I asked for an explanation as to where the original citations came from, and specifically, whether they were generated by artificial intelligence. I have received no response to that query.

[51] While Mr. Ohenhen is not a lawyer with articulated professional responsibilities to the court, every person who submits authorities to the court has an obligation to ensure that those authorities exist. Simple CanLII searches would have revealed to Mr. Ohenhen that these were fictitious citations. Putting fictitious citations before the court misleads the court. It is unacceptable. Whether the cases are put forward by a lawyer or self-represented party, the adverse effect on the administration of justice is the same.

[52] Mr. Ohenhen’s failure to provide a direct and forthright answer to the court’s questions is equally concerning.

[53] Court processes are not voluntary suggestions, to be complied with if convenient or helpful to one’s case. The proper administration of justice requires parties to respect the rules and proceed in a forthright manner. That has not happened here.

[54] I have not attached any consequences to this conduct in this case. However, should such conduct be repeated in any court proceedings, Mr. Ohenhen should expect consequences. Other self-represented litigants should be aware that serious consequences from such conduct may well flow."

"In Rutella's reply in support of his motion to vacate, he cites Green v. John H. Streater, Jr., 666 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1981). DE [69-1] at 8. When the Court was unable to locate Green or any case resembling it, the Court instructed Rutella's attorney, Kevin Krupnick, to either submit a copy of the case or show cause why he should not be sanctioned. See Electronic Order dated May 22, 2025. Krupnick admitted that he fabricated the Green case and claimed that he used it as a “placeholder” in a draft. DE [70-1]. It is implausible that an attorney would cite a case as specific as “Green v. John H. Streater, Jr., 666 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1981)” – which Krupnick admits does not exist – as a “placeholder” that he intended to replace. This is particularly true here, as Plaintiff had already cited the case that he subsequently claimed he intended to use. See DE [69-1] at 3 (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)). Although Krupnick's conduct raises questions of his adherence to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (as he himself concedes), given the Court's recommendation that Rutella's motion to vacate be denied, the Court declines to recommend further action with respect to Rutella's misleading submission. "

"Regardless of whatever resources are used to prepare a party’s brief, every attorney has an ongoing responsibility to review and ensure the accuracy of filings with this and other courts. This includes checking that all case law cited in a brief actually exists and supports the points being made. It is never acceptable to rely on software or technology—no matter how advanced—without reviewing and verifying the information. The use of AI or other technology does not excuse carelessness or failure to follow professional standards.

Technology can be helpful, but it cannot replace a lawyer’s judgment, research, or ethical responsibilities. The practice of law changes with the use of new technology, but the core duties of competence and candor remain the same. Lawyers must adapt to new tools without lowering their standards."

" Plaintiffs identify fictitious quotes and citations in their briefing to support their arguments. For example, Plaintiffs purport to quote language from S.H. Hold v. United States, 853 F.3d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 2017) and Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 2011). (Reed 2, Dkt. No. 23 at 6.) However, the quoted language is nowhere found in those cases. Plaintiffs also cite to a case identified as “Horne v. Potter, 557 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2009).” (Id. at 7.) That citation, however, is for a case titled Bell v. The Hershey Company. Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge they offered fictitious citations. (See Reed 2, Dkt. No. 27.) Plaintiffs are cautioned that providing fictitious cases and quotes will lead to sanctions. "

In this rebuttal, the lawyer cited jurisprudence that the presiding judge (Relator) found to be "impressively so delineated and harmonious with the case". This prompted the judge to investigate the precedent more closely. He discovered that while the case number indicated was real, it belonged to a completely different case unrelated to the legal matter being discussed, leading to the suspicion of an AI "hallucination.

The court concluded:

"It is totally inconceivable to imagine that the Judiciary, already so burdened with countless lawsuits, needs to investigate all the case law set forth in the legal grounds reported by the parties in the procedural documents, despite the duty to act in good faith set forth in Article 5 of the CPC. After all, it is entirely based on the principle of trust expectation that all subjects act in accordance with existing and valid rules.

Thus, even if the appellant claims that such conduct was the result of an error, a claim that has not been satisfactorily proven, but which is taken as a premise for the purposes of argumentation, in the present case, it would be, at the very least, an inexcusable, gross error resulting from serious misconduct, ruling out the possibility of proceeding without any implications in this judicial field, so as not to allow any hesitation in considering the aforementioned conduct as being clearly litigious in bad faith.

Thus, as a result of having acted in a manifestly reckless manner (Art. 80, V of the CPC), I condemn the appellant for litigation in bad faith, and he must pay the fine set at 1% of the value of the case (Art. 81 of the CPC), in accordance with the grounds"

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

The appellant, a lawyer representing himself in an appeal, submitted a brief that included non-existent legal citations. An employee in the lawyer's office had used an AI system to assist in drafting the document. After the opposing counsel and the court itself were unable to locate the cited precedents, the lawyer admitted they were AI-generated and a "good-faith mistake" for which he took full responsibility. While citing its authority to dismiss the appeal entirely due to the submission of non-existent sources, the court chose a "softer" sanction. It proceeded to hear the case, ultimately dismissing the appeal on its merits and imposing a separate monetary penalty payable to the State Treasury for the misconduct.

This judgment, delivered on 6 June 2025 by the Divisional Court of the King's Bench Division, addresses two cases referred under the court's Hamid jurisdiction, which concerns the court's power to enforce duties lawyers owe to the court. Both cases involve lawyers submitting written arguments or evidence containing false information, specifically non-existent case citations, generated through the use of artificial intelligence without proper verification.

The Court used this opportunity to issue broader guidance on the use of AI in legal practice, raising concerns about the competence, training, and supervision of lawyers.

" This Court's local rules permit the use of generative artificial intelligence programs, but all parties, including pro se parties, must certify “that to the extent such a program was used, a human signatory of the document verified the accuracy of all generated text, including all citations and legal authority,” NECivR 7.1(d)(4)(B). The plaintiff's brief contains no such certification, nor does the plaintiff deny using artificial intelligence. See filing 27 at 9.
From the Court's review of the plaintiff's brief, most citations are not hallucinatory. But the plaintiff undeniably cites to cases that do not support the stated legal proposition. For example, the plaintiff asserts that “courts must ‘accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true.’ ” Filing 22 at 3. He attributes the quoted language to Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009). The quote is a boilerplate recitation of the standard on a motion to dismiss, and any number of cases contain that exact language—but not Braden, the case to which the plaintiff attributed the quote.

The plaintiff characterizes the mismatched citations as “[t]ypographical errors or minor misstatements.” Filing 27 at 9. That may be true for some of the mistakes—for example, the case Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) is correctly cited, and it immediately precedes a citation for the nonexistent “Foman v. Arnold,” which might be explained as a typographical error. See filing 22 at 13. But not all the mistakes are so innocent, such as the plaintiff's citation to the nonexistent “Brown v. Maple Tree Homes, Inc.,” purported to be a Nebraska case, the citation to which directs to a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. Filing 22 at 12. This mistake resembles the hallucinatory citations seen in other cases, and is a mistake the plaintiff had an obligation to correct before filing his brief. See Strong v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 8:24-cv-352, 2025 WL 100904, at *6 (D. Neb. Jan. 15, 2025).

The plaintiff also asserts that while the citations may be erroneous, the statements of law are not. The Court agrees that the plaintiff made no substantive misrepresentations of law, so striking the brief is not the appropriate remedy. However, the plaintiff should take notice of the fact that such conduct, if repeated, could subject him to sanctions, even as a pro se litigant. See Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 3:24-cv-304, 2025 WL 1122235, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2025); Rubio v. D.C., No. 23-cv-719, 2024 WL 4957373, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2024); Vargas v. Salazar, No. 4:23-CV-4267, 2024 WL 4804091, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2024); Martin v. Hawai‘i, No. 24-cv-294, 2024 WL 3877013, at *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 20, 2024)."

"The pervasive misrepresentations of the law in Lucas' filings cannot be tolerated. It serves to make a mockery of the judicial process. It causes an enormous waste of judicial resources to try to find cited cases that do not exist and to determine whether a cited authority is relevant or binding, only to determine that most are neither.

In like fashion, Lucas' adversaries also must run to ground the nonexistent cases or address patently irrelevant ones. The adversaries must thus incur needless legal fees and expenses caused by Lucas' pervasive citations to nonexistent or irrelevant cases.

[...]

However, as previously noted Lucas appears to be judgment proof so monetary sanctions likely will not deter her from the abusive practices reflected in her filings and in her previously announced, consistently followed, abuse of the litigation proceedings created by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”). So, the Court must find some other way to protect the interests of justice and to deter Lucas from the abuses which have come to mark her approach to participation as a defendant in the judicial process.

In this case, the most appropriate remedy is to strike Lucas' filings where they are burdensome by virtue of volume and exceed permitted page limits, where they are not cogent or understandable (when given the generous latitude afforded pro se litigants), and where they misrepresent the law by citing nonexistent or utterly irrelevant cases."

In a subsequent Opinion, the court declined to reconsider or review its findings, pointing out that:

"To begin, it is unclear what Lucas means by "contested" citations. The citations that the Court found to not exist are not "contested." They simply do not exist. There is no contesting that fact because the Court checked each citation that was referenced in its MEMORANDUM OPINION, exactly as Lucas cited them (and through other research means), and could not find any citation that matched what Lucas cited. That research demonstrates that the Court's

findings are, in fact, supported rather than "[u]nsupported." Id.

Then, in no way did the Court "wrongly assume[]" that these citations to nonexistent legal authority were "'fabricated' due to the use of generative AI." Id. The Court meticulously checked every citation that it held did not exist in those decisions. Those decisions were not based on "assumptions" but, instead, on the fact that either (1) no case existed under the reporter citation, case name, or quotation that Lucas used, or (2) a case with the reporter citation did exist but was to an entirely different case than the one cited by Lucas and had no relevancy to the issues of this case. ECF No. 170, at 520. And, there was no incorrect assumption that those nonexistent legal authorities were generated, hallucinated, or fabricated by AI because Lucas admitted, on the record, to using AI when writing her filings with the Court. The fact that her citations to nonexistent legal authority are so pervasive, in volume and in location throughout her filings, can lead to only one plausible conclusion: that an AI program hallucinated them in an effort to meet whatever Lucas' desired outcome was based on the prompt that she put into the AI program. As the Court described in its MEMORANDUM OPINION, this is becoming an alarmingly prevalent occurrence common

to AI programs. Id. at 23-26. It is exceedingly clear that it occurred here.

[...]

The MOTION also complains that the Court did not give Lucas an "opportunity to verify or correct citations." Id.

Wholly apart from the fact that it is the litigant's (pro se or represented) burden to verify citations, there is no reason to have accorded Lucas the opportunity to verify because the problem was extensive and pervasive across at least six filings. Moreover, the Court actually did what should have been done before the MOTION was filed by determining that those citations do not exist. No further verification is necessary. And, after a diligent search, if the Court could not find the legal authorities that Lucas purported to rely upon and present as real and binding, it is a folly to believe that Lucas' efforts at "correction" would have returned anything different. Further, she could have taken the opportunity in this MOTION to go through—citation by citation—and "verify" or "correct" them to demonstrate to the Court that its findings were, in fact, incorrect, rather than just baldly and without evidence claiming them to be so. She did not do that."

The Complainant, who was self-represented, used artificial intelligence to assist in preparing her submissions, which included fictitious case citations. The Commission noted the potential seriousness of relying on fabricated citations but did not impose any sanctions on the Complainant, as she was self-represented. The judge held:

"In relation to the issue of the Complainant's reference to what appears to be fictitious case authorities, this is potentially a serious matter because it can be viewed as an attempt to mislead the Commission. If an admitted legal practitioner were to do this, there would be grounds to refer the practitioner to the Legal Services Commission for an allegation of misconduct.

[...]

Given that the Complainant is self-represented, I intend to take the same approach that I adopted in Goodchild and simply afford that part of the Complainant's submissions that deals with the two authorities no weight in determining the two applications. "

" Directing the Court to nonexistent authorities wastes the Court’s time, a resource meant to serve the public, not be monopolized by a single litigant making baseless arguments. "

In an earlier decision, the court had already warned the plaintiff against "any further legal misrepresentations in future communications".

AI Use

Attorneys for Wright County submitted a memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment that contained five case citations generated by artificial intelligence; these citations did not refer to actual judicial decisions. Much of the brief appeared to be AI-written. The attorney who signed and filed the brief, acknowledged that the cited authorities did not exist and that much of the brief was drafted by AI.

Ruling/Sanction

The Court found Counsel's conduct violated Rule 11.02(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, as fake case citations cannot support any legal claim and there's an affirmative duty to investigate the legal underpinnings of a pleading. The Court found no merit in Counsel's defense, noting that the substitute cases she offered did not support the legal contentions in the brief, and the brief demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of legal standards. The Court did not find her insinuation that another, accurate motion document existed to be credible.

Although the Court considered summarily denying the County's motion as a sanction, it ultimately denied the motion on its merits in a concurrent order because the arguments were so clearly incorrect.

The Court declined to order further monetary sanctions, believing its Order to Show Cause and the current Order on Sanctions were sufficient to deter Counsel from relying solely on AI for case citations or legal conclusions in the future. However, the Court referred the matter concerning Counsel's conduct to the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board for further review, as the submission of an AI-generated brief with fake citations raised questions regarding her honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer.

The underlying motion was later withdrawn, with the result that the tentative ruling was not adopted.

(Earlier report and recommendation can be found here.)

AI Use

Counsel admitted at a show cause hearing that he used generative AI tools to draft multiple briefs and did not verify the citations provided by the AI, mistakenly trusting their apparent credibility without checking.

Hallucination Details

Three distinct fake cases across filings. Each was cited in a separate brief, with no attempt at Shepardizing or KeyCiting.

Ruling/Sanction

The Court recommended a $15,000 sanction ($5,000 per violation), with the matter referred to the Chief Judge for potential additional professional discipline. Counsel was also ordered to notify Hoosiervac LLC’s CEO of the misconduct and file a certification of compliance.

Eventually, the court fined Counsel $6,000, stressing that this was sufficient.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The judge stressed that "It is one thing to use AI to assist with initial research, and even nonlegal AI programs may provide a helpful 30,000-foot view. It is an entirely different thing, however, to rely on the output of a generative AI program without verifying the current treatment or validity—or, indeed, the very existence—of the case presented. Confirming a case is good law is a basic, routine matter and something to be expected from a practicing attorney. As noted in the case of an expert witness, an individual's "citation to fake, AI-generated sources . . . shatters his credibility." See Kohls v. Ellison, No. 0:24-cv-03754-LMP-DLM, Doc. 46 at *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2025)."

(Order to show cause is here.)

At the end of the show cause proceedings, Justice Myers noted that, due to the media reports about this case, the goals of any further contempt proceedings were already met, including: "maintaining the dignity of the court and the fairness of civil justice system, promoting honourable behaviour by counsel before the court, denouncing serious misconduct, deterring similar future misconduct by the legal profession, the public generally, and by Ms. Lee specifically, and rehabilitation".

The judge therefore declined to impose a fine or to continue the contempt proceedings, on the condition that Counsel undertakes Continuing Professional Development courses (as she said she would), and does not bill her client for any unrelated work (which was helped by the fact that she had so far been working pro bono).

Sequel

It later surfaced that Ms. Lee had not been fully honest with the court, leading to renewed contempt proceedings (see here).

After the Applicant confessed having relied on ChatGPT for the written phase of the proceedings, hearing was adjourned and the Court "cautioned the Applicant on relying on ChatGPT for legal advice and suggested that the Applicant may wish to seek legal advice from a lawyer about his application."

The court ultimately found that one of the authorities illustrated "the risk in relying on ChatGPT and Generative AI for legal advice. The Applicant’s description of the decision in this case in his submissions, for which he used ChatGPT to prepare, is clearly wrong. "

AI Use

Counsel admitted that incorrect citations arose from reliance on an AI-enabled database called “Takdin AI.” The tool generated incorrect references to multiple Supreme Court decisions and falsely cited them as supporting key propositions. Counsel claimed the errors stemmed from time pressure and good faith, but the Court found the explanation inadequate.

Hallucination Details

At least 8 citations were found to be fictitious or unrelated to the argument, including:

• Afriedar v. Rosh HaAyin Municipality (Ra'ava 6774/19), which had been overturned and clearly marked as such
• Phoenix v. Avital and Novartis decisions, which were either non-existent or misquoted
• References to non-existent sections of the Civil Procedure Regulations and the Class Actions Law

The hallucinated citations were used in response to motions to dismiss and as the basis for substantive legal claims in the class certification request.

Ruling/Sanction

The Court:

• Struck the class certification request due to cumulative procedural abuses and AI hallucinations
• Explicitly ruled that the applicant's counsel is not suitable to serve as representative counsel in this proceeding or any similar one filed in its place
• Imposed monetary fines: (i) The Mahala Association was ordered to pay NIS 10,000 to each of the four respondents (totaling NIS 40,000); Counsel was ordered to pay personal costs: NIS 5,000 to the first respondent (Clalit) and NIS 5,000 to the State Treasury (totaling NIS 10,000).

Key Judicial Reasoning

The Court emphasized that the inclusion of hallucinated sources—regardless of intent—subverted proper legal process. Citations must be verified, and AI does not absolve attorneys from professional responsibility. The systemic risks posed by hallucinated filings necessitate a firm response going forward

The Family Court noted that one motion cited case law that does "not exist at all". This raised "concern about uncontrolled use of artificial intelligence technology," referencing recent Supreme Court guidance on the need for an appropriate judicial response to such instances.

On appeal, the District Court acknowledged the Family Court's finding regarding the non-existent case law and the suspicion of AI use. However, like the Family Court, it did not impose a separate sanction for this, as the appeal was dismissed primarily on the grounds of the delay and lack of merit concerning the protocol correction itself

The judge pointed out that the plaintiffs' written request included what appeared to be a direct quote from one of her own previous judgments. However, upon examination, she found that not only did this quote not exist in the cited judgment, but the judgment itself did not even address the legal question at stake.

Counsel's explanation of what happened can be found here.

" The Court has serious reason to believe that Plaintiff used artificial intelligence tools to assist in drafting her objection. While the use of such tools is not prohibited, artificial intelligence often cites to legal authorities, like Cabrera, that do not exist. Continuing to cite to non-existent cases will result in sanctions up to and including dismissal. "

AI Use

The fabricated citations originated from a ChatGPT query submitted by an unlicensed law clerk at Petitioner's law firm. Neither Counsel reviewed the petition’s contents before filing. The firm had no AI use policy in place at the time, though they implemented one after the order to show cause was issued.

Hallucination Details

Chief among the hallucinations was Royer v. Nelson, which Respondents demonstrated existed only in ChatGPT’s output and in no official database. Other cited cases were also inapposite or unverifiable. Petitioner’s counsel admitted fault and stated they were unaware AI had been used during drafting.

Ruling/Sanction

The court issued three targeted sanctions:

• Attorney fees: Respondents’ counsel are to submit an itemized bill; Counsel must pay within 10 days of receipt
• Client refund: Petitioner’s counsel must refund all fees paid by Mr. Garner in relation to the defective petition
• Charitable payment: Counsel must donate $1,000 to “and Justice for all” within 14 days and file proof of payment with the court

Key Judicial Reasoning

The panel (Per Curiam) emphasized that the conduct, while not malicious, still diverted judicial resources and imposed unnecessary burdens on the opposing party. Unlike Mata or Hayes, the attorneys in this case quickly admitted the issue and cooperated, which the court acknowledged. Nonetheless, the submission of fabricated law—especially under counsel's signature—breaches core duties of candor and verification, warranting formal sanctions. The court warned that Utah’s judiciary cannot be expected to verify every citation and must be able to trust lawyers to do so

After being ordered to show cause, plaintiff admitted having used AI for several filings.

" While in our discretion we will not impose sanctions on petitioner, who is proceeding pro se, we warn petitioner that continuing to cite nonexistent caselaw could result in the imposition of sanctions in the future. "

AI Use

First Counsel, who had not previously used AI for legal work, used an unspecified AI tool to assist with drafting a response. He failed to verify the citation before submission. Second Counsel, as local counsel, filed the response without checking the content or accuracy, even though he signed the document.

Second Counsel then said that he had initiated "procedural safeguards to prevent this error from happening again by ensuring he, and local counsel, undertake a comprehensive review of all citations and arguments filed with this and every court prior to submission to ensure their provenance can be traced to professional non-AI sources."

Hallucination Details

The hallucinated case was cited as controlling Delaware authority on privilege assignments. When challenged by Plaintiff, Defendants initially filed a bare withdrawal without explanation. Only upon court order did they disclose the AI origin and acknowledge the error. Counsel personally apologized to the court and opposing counsel.

Ruling/Sanction

Judge William Matthewman imposed a multi-part sanction:

• Attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in rebutting the hallucinated citation—jointly payable by Counsel
• Required CLE on AI ethics within 30 days, with proof of completion due by June 20, 2025
• Monetary fines: $1,000 (First Counsel) and $500 (Second Counsel), payable to the Court registry

The Court emphasized that the submission of hallucinated citations—particularly when filed and signed by two attorneys—constitutes reckless disregard for procedural and ethical obligations. Though no bad faith was found, the conduct was sanctionable under Rule 11, § 1927, the Court’s inherent authority, and local professional responsibility rules.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The Court distinguished this case from more egregious incidents (O’Brien v. Flick, Thomas v. Pangburn) because the attorneys admitted their error and did not lie or attempt to cover it up. However, the delay in correction and failure to check the citation in the first place were serious enough to warrant monetary penalties and educational obligations.

Applicant sought an administrative court order to force the Israel National Academy of Sciences to let him speak at a conference on "Artificial Intelligence and Research: Uses, Prospects, Dangers". This was dismissed, with the court adding:

" I will add this: As mentioned above, the subject of the conference where the applicant wishes to speak concerns, among other things, the dangers of artificial intelligence. Indeed, one of these dangers materialized in the applicant's request: He, who is not represented, stated clearly and fairly that he used artificial intelligence for his request. An examination of the request shows that it consequently suffered from 'AI hallucinations' – it mentioned many "judgments" that never came into existence (Regarding this problem, see: HCJ 38379-12-24 Anonymous v. The Sharia Court of Appeals Jerusalem, paragraphs 13-12 (23.2.2025) (hereinafter: the Anonymous matter); HCJ 23602-01-25 The Association for the Advancement of Dog Rights v. The Minister of Agriculture, paragraphs 12-11 (28.2.2025) (hereinafter: the Association matter); and regarding the mentioned problem and the possibility of participating in the conference, see: Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 43a). Just recently, this Court warned, in no uncertain terms, that alongside the blessings of artificial intelligence, one must take excellent care against its pitfalls; 'Eat its inside, throw away its peel' (Anonymous matter, paragraph 26; Association matter, paragraph 19). The applicant did state, clearly, that he used artificial intelligence, and in light of this, he further requested that if a 'technical' error occurred under his hand – it should be seen as a good-faith mistake, not to be held against him. I cannot accept such a request. It does not cure the problems of hallucinating artificial intelligence. Those addressing this Court, whether represented or unrepresented alike, bear the burden of examining whether the precedents they refer to - which are not a 'technical' matter, but rather the beating heart of the pleadings - indeed exist, and substantiate their claims. For this reason too - the request must be dismissed"

(Translation by Gemini 2.5).

AI Use

Counsel filed a motion to dismiss appeal that cited “Greenspan v. Greenspan, 121 Hawai‘i 60, 71, 214 P.3d 557, 568 (App. 2009).” The court found that:

• No Hawai‘i case titled Greenspan v. Greenspan exists
• The citations to “121 Hawai‘i 60” and “214 P.3d 568” were in fact to other real cases (Estate of Roxas v. Marcos and Colorado Court of Appeals cases), suggesting a garbled AI-generated fabrication
• Counsel admitted delegating the brief to a per diem attorney and failing to verify the citation before filing

Ruling/Sanction

• $100 sanction imposed on counsel personally
• Payment to be made to the Supreme Court Clerk of Hawai‘i within seven days
• DiPasquale ordered to file a declaration attesting to payment.

The amount reflects counsel’s candor and corrective measures, but the court noted that federal courts have imposed higher sanctions in similar cases.

AI Use

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, cited “Darling v. Linde, Inc., No. 21-cv-01258, 2023 WL 2320117 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2023)” in briefing. The court stated it could not locate the case in any major legal database or via internet search and noted this could trigger Rule 11 sanctions if not based on a reasonable inquiry. The ruling cited Saxena v. Martinez-Hernandez as a cautionary example involving AI hallucinations, suggesting the court suspected similar conduct here.

Counsel later explained how the motion came to be: see here.

AI Use

In a filing related to a third-party notice, the defendant cited a judgment that did not exist. The judge clarified that this was not simply a mistaken citation or party confusion, but rather a reference to an entirely fictional judgment. The court explicitly stated: “It is not clear how such an error occurs, except through the use of artificial intelligence.”

Ruling/Sanction

The court permitted the defendant to proceed with the third-party notice but ordered partial costs (₪1,200) to be paid to the plaintiff due to procedural irregularities. The judge demanded a formal explanation of how the fictitious citation was introduced, in order to prevent recurrence

Key Judicial Reasoning

While the procedural error did not warrant barring the defendant’s claim against a third party, the court emphasized that referencing a fictional legal source is a serious issue requiring scrutiny. The opinion signals a growing judicial intolerance for unverified AI-assisted legal drafting in Israeli courts.

AI Use

A paralegal used public search tools and unspecified “AI-based research assistants” to generate legal citations. The resulting hallucinated cases were passed to Counsel, who filed them without verification. Four out of eight cited cases were found to be fictitious:

• London v. Polish Slavic Fed. Credit Union, No. 19-CV-6645
• Rosario v. 2022 E. Tremont Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 21-CV-9010
• Paniagua v. El Gallo No. 3 Corp., No. 22-CV-7073
• Luna v. Gon Way Constr., Inc., No. 20-CV-893

Ruling/Sanction

The court imposed a $1,000 sanction against Counsel and her firm. Counsel was ordered to serve the sanction order on her client and file proof of service. The court declined harsher penalties, crediting her swift admission, apology, and internal reforms.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The court found subjective bad faith due to the complete absence of verification. It cited a range of other AI-related sanction decisions, underscoring that even outsourcing to a “diligent and trusted” paralegal is not a defense when due diligence is absent.

AI Use

Bandla denied using AI, claiming instead to have relied on Google searches to locate “supportive” case law. He admitted that he did not verify any of the citations and never checked them against official sources. The court found this unacceptable, particularly from someone formerly admitted as a solicitor.

Hallucination Details

Bandla’s submissions cited at least 27 cases which the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) could not locate.

Bandla maintained summaries and quotations from these cases in formal submissions. When pressed in court, he admitted having never read the judgments, let alone verified their existence.

Ruling/Sanction

The High Court refused the application for an extension of time, finding Bandla’s explanations inconsistent and unreliable. The court independently struck out the appeal on grounds of abuse of process due to the submission of fake authority. It imposed indemnity costs of £24,727.20. The judge emphasized that even after being alerted to the fictitious nature of the cases, Bandla neither withdrew nor corrected them.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The court found Bandla’s conduct deeply troubling, noting his previous experience as a solicitor and his professed commitment to legal standards. It held that the deliberate or grossly negligent inclusion of fake case law—especially in an attempt to challenge a disciplinary disbarment—was an abuse requiring strong institutional response.

The second respondent, Carly Dakota Wise, a self-represented litigant, filed an application for the recusal of a tribunal member, alleging bias and procedural unfairness. The application was based on several grounds, including fabricated legal citations - despite Ms. Wise having been warned in interlocutory proceedings to check the authorities she relied on. The court cited the local Guidelines for the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) Guidelines for Responsible Use by Non-Lawyers, available here, to stress that self-represented litigants need to check the accuracy of their pleadings.

AI Use

The petition’s pages were marked “Criado com MobiOffice.” The STF verified that MobiOffice includes a built-in AI writing assistant. Combined with the inclusion of fictitious citations, this led the Court to conclude that AI had been used and not reviewed. The judge characterized this as reckless conduct.

Hallucination Details

• Claimed violations of STF precedents including RE 464.867/SP and RE 226.855/RS, which were either inapplicable or misrepresented
• Claimed Súmula Vinculante 6 said something entirely false (its actual content concerns military service remuneration)
• Cited judgments ARE 1.218.084 AgR and RE 328.111/DF as relevant when they were either misquoted or irrelevant
• Court concluded these references were invented or misrepresented, “false statements intended to mislead”

Ruling/Sanction

• Rejected the complaint as manifestly inadmissible
• Found that counsel likely used AI and submitted the petition without review
• Ordered notification to both the national and Bahia sections of the OAB
• Declared the petitioner litigated in bad faith under Article 80, V, of the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code
• Imposed a procedural penalty of double the initial court costs
• Ordered referral to dívida ativa (federal collections) if not paid.

AI Use

The court found that several of the cases cited by the plaintiff in her briefing opposing Officer Hill’s qualified immunity defense did not exist. Although Newbern suggested the citations may have been innocent mistakes, she did not challenge the finding of fabrication. No AI tool was admitted or named, but the structure and specificity of the invented cases strongly suggest generative AI use.

Hallucination Details

The fabricated authorities were not background references, but “key authorities” cited to establish that Hill’s alleged conduct violated clearly established law. The court observed that the fake cases initially appeared to be unusually on-point compared to the rest of plaintiff’s citations, which raised suspicion. Upon scrutiny, it confirmed they did not exist.

Ruling/Sanction

The court dismissed the federal claims against Officer Hill as a partial sanction for plaintiff’s fabrication of legal authority and failure to meet the burden under qualified immunity. However, it declined to dismiss the entire case, citing the interest of the minor child involved and the relevance of potential state law claims. It permitted discovery to proceed on those claims to determine whether Officer Hill acted with malice or engaged in other conduct falling outside the scope of Mississippi Tort Claims Act immunity.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The court found that plaintiff’s citation of fictitious cases undermined her effort to meet the demanding “clearly established” standard. It rejected her claim that the fabrication was an innocent mistake and viewed it in light of her broader litigation conduct, which included excessive filings and disregard for procedural limits.

AI Use

Counsel explained that the hallucinated citations were included in a draft intended for personal legal research and learning, which was mistakenly filed with the court. This constituted an implicit admission that generative AI tools were involved.

Ruling/Sanction

While Judge Itay Katz did not impose personal costs, he referred the matter to the Legal Department of the Judicial Authority to determine whether further steps—including referral to the Israel Bar Association Ethics Committee—should be taken. The court emphasized this was done as a gesture of leniency with the hope that such behavior will not recur.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The court referred to several other recent Israeli cases to underscore the growing recognition of AI hallucination risk in legal practice. It reiterated the requirement for attorneys to meticulously verify any citation before submission and warned that future similar instances may not receive such lenient treatment.

AI Use

Dr. Wright, after beginning to represent himself, repeatedly used AI engines (such as ChatGPT or similar) to generate legal documents. These documents were characterized by the court as "highly verbose and repetitious" and full of "legal nonsense". This use of AI contributed to filings containing numerous false references to authority and misrepresentations of existing law.

Hallucination Details

While the core issue in Dr. Wright's litigation was his fundamental dishonesty (claiming to be Satoshi Nakamoto based on "lies and ... elaborately forged documents" ), the use of AI introduced specific problems. His appeal documents, bearing signs of AI creation, contained "numerous false references to authority". His later submissions also involved "citation of non-existent authorities". This AI-driven production of flawed legal arguments formed part of his broader pattern of disrespect for court rules and process.

Ruling/Sanction

Mr Justice Mellor granted a General Civil Restraint Order (GCRO) against Dr. Wright for a three-year period. He found that an Extended CRO (ECRO) would be insufficient given the scope and persistence of Dr. Wright's abusive litigation. The court also referred Dr. Wright's conduct to the Attorney General for consideration of a civil proceedings order under s.42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Dr. Wright was ordered to pay the applicants' costs for the CRO application, summarily assessed at £100,000.

Key Judicial Reasoning

The court found "overwhelming" evidence that Dr. Wright had persistently brought claims that were Totally Without Merit (TWM), numbering far more than the required threshold. This conduct involved extensive lies and forgeries across multiple jurisdictions and targeted individuals who often lacked the resources to defend themselves. The judge concluded there was a "very significant risk" that Dr. Wright would continue this abusive conduct unless restrained. The court noted his consistent contempt for court rules and processes, including his perjury, forgery, breach of orders, and flawed submissions (including those using AI). A GCRO was deemed just and proportionate to protect both potential future litigants and the finite resources of the court system

The STF relator found that the petition relied on decisions that could not be located and contained false statements about the content of Súmula Vinculante n.º 6 and other precedents. The petition bore a 'Criado com MobiOffice' watermark and the relator concluded the author likely used an AI writing assistant without review. The complaint was denied, bad faith was declared and procedural costs were doubled; OAB was notified.