AI Hallucination Cases

In the case of Smith v. Gamble, the appellant, Karen A. Gamble nka Smith, moved to strike the appellee brief filed by Gary C. Gamble III, alleging that several case citations were fraudulent, as they were either inaccurate, non-existent, or completely false. The court directed the appellee, Father, to provide copies of the cited cases, which he failed to do. Consequently, the court found that Father used nonexistent cases and inappropriate citations, likely generated by an AI tool, to support his arguments. The court denied the motion to strike the brief but granted sanctions against Father for the time and expense incurred by Mother in uncovering the fraudulent citations. The matter was referred to a magistrate to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions.

In the case AQ v. BW, the applicant AQ claimed damages for the non-consensual sharing of an intimate image by the respondent BW. Both parties were self-represented. The tribunal found that BW shared an intimate image of AQ without consent, violating the Intimate Images Protection Act (IIPA). BW attempted to defend their actions by citing a fabricated version of CRTA section 92, which was identified as a hallucination likely generated by artificial intelligence. Judge held:

"16. I have considered my obligation to give sufficient reasons. I do not consider that obligation to include responding to arguments concocted by artificial intelligence that have no basis in law. I accept that artificial intelligence can be a useful tool to help people find the right language to present their arguments, if used properly. However, people who blindly use artificial intelligence often end up bombarding the CRT with endless legal arguments. They cannot reasonably expect the CRT to address them all. So, while I have reviewed all the parties’ materials and considered all their arguments, I have decided against addressing many of the issues they raise. If I do not address a particular argument in this decision, it is because the argument lacks any merit, is about something plainly irrelevant, or both."

The tribunal dismissed BW's defenses as baseless and awarded AQ $5,000 in damages and an additional $1,000 for time spent due to BW's submission of irrelevant evidence. The tribunal emphasized that arguments concocted by AI without legal basis would not be addressed.

The court noted that:

"both Lehr-Guthrie's and McDonald's briefs are replete with errors in their citations to case authority, such as repeated citation errors, references to nonexistent quotes, and incorrect statements about the cases (for instance, as noted above, the two cases McDonald cited for a proposition relating to the duty of impartiality don't even reference that duty). This suggests to us that the briefs may have been drafted with the use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI). “[U]sing a GAI tool to draft a legal document can pose serious risks if the user does not thoroughly review the tool's output.” Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 32. Self-represented litigants must be particularly careful, as they “may not understand that a GAI tool may confidently respond to a query regarding a legal topic ‘even if the answer contains errors, hallucinations, falsehoods, or biases.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).4 We advise the parties that errors caused by GAI in future filings may result in sanctions. See id. at ¶ 41. "

The court warned that future errors caused by AI could result in sanctions.

"Further, these inaccuracies signal that Plaintiff's counsel may have used AI to assist in the drafting of Plaintiff's Response (or otherwise counsel produced exceptionally sloppy work). In this regard, this Court's Chambers Rules include “Disclosure and Certification Requirements” for use of “Generative Artificial Intelligence” and expressly provide that an attorney or party must disclose in any document to be filed with the Court “that AI was used and the specific AI tool that was used” and to “certify in the document that the person has checked the accuracy of any portion of the document drafted by generative AI, including all citations and legal authority.” See id.6 No such disclosure and certification has been made in this case. The Court's Rules further provide that an attorney will be responsible for the contents of any documents prepared with generative AI, in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the failure to make the disclosure and certification “may result in the imposition of sanctions.”"

Counsel in charge apologised to the Court in a letter (available here), explaining that he had failed to supervise the work of his subordinates.

"In a prior order, we struck portions of Walker's brief that included citations to nonexistent cases. We note that the arguments raised would not have changed the outcome of the appeal in any event. "

Defendant Holly Nelson, appearing pro se, filed a motion to dismiss that included a fabricated case citation, Finch v. Smith, which does not exist. The court inferred that Nelson used AI to draft the motion without verifying the accuracy of the citations. The court issued an order to show cause, requiring Nelson to justify why her filing does not violate Rule 11, or alternatively, to withdraw her motion. If she fails to do so, the court intends to strike her motion entirely.

"14    Here, the applicant's solicitor’s use of AI in the preparation of two court documents has given rise to cost, inconvenience and delay to the parties and has compromised the effectiveness of the administration of justice. But I do not consider the use of AI in this case means that it is appropriate to refer the solicitors’ conduct to the Victorian Legal Services Board. Here an inexperienced junior solicitor was given the task of preparing document citations for an amended pleading, and did so while working remotely and without access to the documents to be cited. In attempting to cite the relevant documents she used an (apparently AI-assisted) research tool which she considered had produced accurate citations when she previously used it. And as soon as Massar Briggs Law was told of the false citations the problem was addressed. The junior solicitor and the principal solicitor have apologised or expressed their regret to the other parties and the Court, and there was no suggestion that they were not genuine in doing so.

15    The junior solicitor took insufficient care in using Googe Scholar as the source of document citations in court documents, and in failing to check the citations against the physical and electronic copies of the cited documents that were held at Massar Briggs Law’s office. The error was centrally one of failing to check and verify the output of the search tool, which was contributed to by the inexperience of the junior solicitor and the failure of Mr Briggs to have systems in place to ensure that her work was appropriately supervised and checked. To censure those errors it is sufficient that these reasons be published."

Counsel for the claimant admitted to using an AI tool to draft the initial legal document without verifying its content. This resulted in the creation of non-existent judicial precedents to support the claimant's case. The court found this to be a serious violation of procedural loyalty and good faith, as it attempted to deceive the court and the opposing party. Consequently, the claimant was fined 5% of the updated value of the case for litigating in bad faith, although the lawyer's apologies were partially accepted, preventing a higher fine.

Details of the case have first been reported in a LinkedIn post by a local lawyer.

Fake citation, in this brief, was to : Moms Against Poverty v. Dep’t of State, 2022 WL 17951329, at *3 . Case docket can be found here.

Counsel later confirmed having used ChatGPT and apologised.

Counsel alleged that he only made a typo, but this did not convince the judges, who did not comment further.

"[92] In Mavundla, the court emphasised the trite duty of legal practitioners not to mislead the court, whether through negligence or intent. This includes the duty to present an honest account of the law, which means (inter alia) not presenting fictitious or non-existent cases.24 In my view, it matters not that such cases were not presented orally, but were contained in written heads of argument. Written heads are as important a memorial of counsel’s argument as oral argument and, for purely practical reasons, are often more heavily relied upon by judges.

[...]

[95] In this case, counsel’s explanations bear out their submission that there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the court in relation to the use of incorrect case citations in the heads of argument. Their apologies are acknowledged. As is clear from Mavundla, however, even negligence in this context may have grave repercussions particularly to the administration of justice and, in appropriate circumstances, could constitute serious professional misconduct.

[96] As a consequence, it is appropriate to make the same order as in Mavundla, namely that the conduct of theapplicant’s legal practitioners is referred to the Legal Practice Council for investigation."

In the case of Crespo v. Tesla, Inc., the pro se plaintiff, Leonardo Crespo, submitted discovery motions containing fabricated case citations and a false quote, which were identified as potentially generated by AI. The court ordered Crespo to show cause for these submissions and admitted to using AI in his filings. The court acknowledged Crespo's candor and imposed sanctions requiring him to apologize to the defendant's counsel and pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in addressing the fake citations.

(In a subsequent ruling, the court averred that the reasonable fees amount was 921 USD.)

" After the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce, Nimat Shahid (“Wife”) filed a petition to reopen the case and set aside the final judgment, arguing that service by publication was improper. The trial court denied the motion, using an order that relied upon non-existent case law."

"We are troubled by the citation of bogus cases in the trial court's order. As the reviewing court, we make no findings of fact as to how this impropriety occurred, observing only that the order purports to have been prepared by Husband's attorney, Diana Lynch. We further note that Lynch had cited the two fictitious cases that made it into the trial court's order in Husband's response to the petition to reopen, and she cited additional fake cases both in that Response and in the Appellee's Brief filed in this Court. "

The court observed that the original motion to remand filed pro se by the plaintiff contained non-existent case law and falsified quotations. Although the court did not impose sanctions in this instance, it warned that future use of fake legal authority would result in a show cause order, including against the Counsel who later joined the case.

Plaintiff Ravel Ferrera Parra, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against the United States alleging financial harm due to misconduct by various judicial and governmental entities. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, as the claims were not within the court's purview.

The court noted that Plaintiff's filings appeared to be assisted by AI, as evidenced by the rapid filing of responses tell-tale language ("Would you like additional affidavits, supporting exhibits, or further refinements before submission?"), the inclusion of fabricated case citations. "While Plaintiff’s use of AI, by itself, does not violate this Court’s Rules, Plaintiff’s citation to fake cases does."

The court further pointed out that:

"“It is no secret that generative AI programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases.” Sanders, 176 Fed. Cl. at 169 (citation omitted). That appears to have happened here. When searching the Federal Claims Reporter for “Tucker v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 326 (2006),” Plaintiff’s citation brings the Court to the third page of Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 324, 326 (2006), a real tax case from this Court. Similarly, the AI used by Plaintiff in Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 169 (2025) also made up a citation to a case called Tucker v. United States. Perhaps both AI programs hallucinated this case name based on the Tucker Act, this Court’s jurisdictional statute. Regardless, here, as in Sanders, the citation to a case called Tucker v. United States does not exist."

The court warned Plaintiff about the risks of using AI-generated content without verification but did not impose sanctions.

"Generative AI can be beguiling, particularly when the task of representing yourself seems overwhelming. However, a litigant runs the risk that their case will be damaged, rather than helped, if they choose to use AI without taking the time to understand what it produces, and to confirm that it is both legally and factually accurate. "

"Regarding the petitioner, this is a case of improper conduct, to say the least, on the part of its counsel (who apologized for it), who made use of artificial intelligence in the petition and in the supplementary argument, in which many non-existent and/or erroneous judgments were inserted and embedded. In accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling, there would have been grounds, as a result, for dismissing the petition outright, but I did not do so due to the conduct of the state, as detailed above, and due to the importance of publishing the tender. However, in this case, there is no place to award costs in favor of the petitioner, due to this improper conduct (as, beyond that, the petition also requested many remedies, some of which are not within the jurisdiction of this court)."

(Translation by Gemini 2.5.)

"Before addressing the merits of Schoene’s motion, the Court notes that Schoene cited several cases in her reply brief to support her motion to amend, including Butler v. Oregon, 218 Or. App. 114 (2008), Curry v. Actavis, Inc., 2017 LEXIS 139126 (D. Or. Aug. 30, 2017), Estate of Riddell v. City of Portland, 194 Or. App. 227 (2004), Hampton v. City of Oregon City, 251 Or. App. 206 (2012), and State v. Burris, 107 Or. App. 542 (1991). These cases, however, do not exist. Schoene’s false citations appear to be hallmarks of an artificial intelligence (“AI”) tool, such as ChatGPT. It is now well known that AI tools “hallucinate” fake cases. See Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (noting, in February 2024, that the issue of fictitious cases being submitted to courts had gained “national attention”).6 In addition, the Court notes that a basic internet search seeking guidance on whether it is advisable to use AI tools to conduct legal research or draft legal briefs will explain that any legal authorities or legal analysis generated by AI needs to be verified. The Court cautions Schoene that she must verify the accuracy of any future citations she may include in briefing before this Court and other courts"

In the original order, the court held:

"[38] Applicants’ counsel provided further correspondence advising, for the first time, of his reliance on Visto.ai described as a professional legal research platform designed specifically for Canadian immigration and refugee law practitioners. He also indicated that he did not independently verify the citations as they were understood to reflect well established and widely accepted principles of law. In other words, the undeclared and unverified artificial intelligence had no impact, and the substantive legal argument was unaffected and supported by other cases.

[39] I do not accept that this is permissible. The use of generative artificial intelligence is increasingly common and a perfectly valid tool for counsel to use; however, in this Court, its use must be declared and as a matter of both practice, good sense and professionalism, its output must be verified by a human. The Court cannot be expected to spend time hunting for cases which do not exist or considering erroneous propositions of law.

[40] In fact, the two case hallucinations were not the full extent of the failure of the artificial intelligence product used. It also hallucinated the proper test for the admission on judicial review of evidence not before the decision-maker and cited, as authority, a case which had no bearing on the issue at all. To be clear, this was not a situation of a stray case with a variation of the established test but, rather, an approach similar to the test for new evidence on appeal. As noted above, the case relied upon in support of the wrong test (Cepeda-Gutierrez) has nothing to do with the issue. I note in passing that the case comprises 29 paragraphs and would take only a few minutes to review.

[41] In addition, counsel’s reliance on artificial intelligence was not revealed until after the issuance of four Directions. I find that this amounts to an attempt to mislead the Court and to conceal the reliance by describing the hallucinated authorities as “mis-cited” Had the initial request for a Book of Authorities resulted in the explanation in the last letter, I may have been more sympathetic. As matters stand, I am concerned that counsel does not recognize the seriousness of the issue."

In the final order, the court added:

"While the use of generative AI is not the responsibility of the responding party, it was not appropriate for the Respondent to not make any response to the Court’s four directions and Order. Indeed, assuming that the Respondent noticed the hallucinated cases on receipt of the written argument, it should have brought this to the attention of the Court.

[...]

Given that Applicant’s counsel was not remunerated for his services in the file, which included the motion on which the offending factum was filed and a motion for a stay of removal and, in addition, that I am also of the view that the Respondent’s lack of action exacerbated matters and it should not benefit as a result, I am ordering a modest amount of $100 to be payable by Applicant’s counsel personally."

Referring to Ayinde, the judge held that "The principle is essentially the same - though I hasten to say that I would not push the analogy too far as to a factual comparison of the present case with that case and the error in the present case is not of the order of the misconduct in that case. However, appreciable judicial time was wasted on the issue - not least trying to find the source of the quotation. And it does illustrate:

• The vital importance of precision and accuracy in written submissions. That duty lies on lay litigants as much as on lawyers.
• That text in submissions formatted so as to convey that it is a direct and verbatim quotation from an identified source must be exactly that. Of course, it is permissible to edit the text (for example to exclude irrelevant content or by underlining for emphasis) but, if so, that it has been done must be apparent on the face of the document.
• That opposing parties are entitled to written submissions in good time to check them.

43. All that said, in a substantive sense, the issue is not vital to this case. The underlying proposition for which Mr Malone contends - that domestic courts must implement EU law - is uncontroversial. Not least for that reason, and in light also of the manner in which Mr Malone generally presented his case at the hearing, I am inclined to accept that there was no attempt or intention to mislead and accept also that Mr Malone has apologized for the error. It does not affect the outcome of the present motions."

After other side pointed out that all authorities cited were fictitious, Counsel admitted it in brief. The court seemingly did not react.

Plaintiff's counsel in the case of Mintvest Capital, LTD v. NYDIG Trust Company, et al., was found to have included numerous non-existent cases, false quotations, and misrepresented precedents in their filings. The errors were attributed to the use of the AI tool 'Claude' without proper verification. The court recommended sanctions under Rule 11, requiring the attorney to pay the defendants' attorney fees related to the faulty submissions. The court emphasized the need for attorneys to ensure the accuracy of citations, especially when using AI tools, to maintain professional standards.

"When the parties came before the court on 22 May 2025, there had been little time for the plaintiff, the first defendant and the court to examine the second defendant’s written submissions served late on the night before. It was nevertheless immediately apparent that the second defendant sought to rely upon authority and court rules which were not merely misstated but, in some circumstances, imaginary. I am satisfied that all of the judgments and rules referred to in the submissions of 21 May 2025 were misstated, non-existent, or both, and that Gen AI had been used to prepare these submissions.

An example was the citation of a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales described as “Wu v Wilks” (I will not provide the citation given in full, as there is a risk of it being picked up as genuine by other Gen AI: Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26 at [14]). There is no decision with this name, either in the Supreme Court of New South Wales or in any other jurisdictions. The caselaw citation given for “Wu v Wilks” belonged to a judgment on wholly unrelated material and the principles of law for which it was cited. All of the citations suffered similar problems.

I drew these issues to the attention of the second defendant and enquired whether she had used Gen AI in the preparation of her submissions and, if so, whether she was aware of the Practice Note. She acknowledged that she had done so but said this was because she had very little time to provide submissions in reply and was deeply distressed by these proceedings"

Claimant used Chat GPT to assist in drafting his grounds of appeal and skeleton argument. The documents included fabricated citations and misrepresented case summaries. Claimant admitted to using Chat GPT and apologized for the errors.

Compounding matters, the court suspected that the respondent had also used AI, since the cases cited in the Counsel's skeleton, though extant, did not support any of the propositions made - and Counsel was unable to explain how they got there.

In the case of J.R.V. v. N.L.V., the respondent, appearing in person, used a generative AI tool to prepare parts of her written argument. This resulted in the inclusion of citations to non-existent cases, known as 'hallucinations.' The claimant sought costs due to the need to research and respond to these false citations. The court acknowledged the issue but noted that the respondent was not represented by counsel and was unaware of the AI's capability to generate false citations. Moreover, the claimant was wrong as to the alleged non-existence of some citations. The court ordered the respondent to pay $200 in costs to the claimant.

"[49] Mr. Ohenhen submitted a statement of legal argument to the court in support of his arguments. In those documents, he referred to at least two non-existent or fake precedent court cases, one ostensibly from the Court of Appeal for Ontario and another ostensibly from the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In reviewing his materials after argument, I tried to access these cases and was unable to find them. I asked the parties to provide them to me.

[50] Mr. Ohenhen responded with a “clarification”, providing different citations to different cases. I asked for an explanation as to where the original citations came from, and specifically, whether they were generated by artificial intelligence. I have received no response to that query.

[51] While Mr. Ohenhen is not a lawyer with articulated professional responsibilities to the court, every person who submits authorities to the court has an obligation to ensure that those authorities exist. Simple CanLII searches would have revealed to Mr. Ohenhen that these were fictitious citations. Putting fictitious citations before the court misleads the court. It is unacceptable. Whether the cases are put forward by a lawyer or self-represented party, the adverse effect on the administration of justice is the same.

[52] Mr. Ohenhen’s failure to provide a direct and forthright answer to the court’s questions is equally concerning.

[53] Court processes are not voluntary suggestions, to be complied with if convenient or helpful to one’s case. The proper administration of justice requires parties to respect the rules and proceed in a forthright manner. That has not happened here.

[54] I have not attached any consequences to this conduct in this case. However, should such conduct be repeated in any court proceedings, Mr. Ohenhen should expect consequences. Other self-represented litigants should be aware that serious consequences from such conduct may well flow."

Gbolahan Kareem, representing himself, appealed a decision denying his motion to reduce child support payments. His appeal was based on a claimed substantial change in circumstances due to the expiration of his work authorization. However, his appellate brief contained incorrectly cited cases, suggesting reliance on unreliable sources, possibly an AI tool like ChatGPT. The court noted the incorrect citation of 'In re Marriage of Zells' and the inability to locate 'In re Marriage of Amland', indicating fabricated citations. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, citing Gbolahan's failure to provide a complete record or valid legal authority, and presumed the trial court applied the correct law.

Counsel said that "The inclusion of inaccurate citations was inadvertent and the result of reliance on an automated legal citation tool."

"In Rutella's reply in support of his motion to vacate, he cites Green v. John H. Streater, Jr., 666 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1981). DE [69-1] at 8. When the Court was unable to locate Green or any case resembling it, the Court instructed Rutella's attorney, Kevin Krupnick, to either submit a copy of the case or show cause why he should not be sanctioned. See Electronic Order dated May 22, 2025. Krupnick admitted that he fabricated the Green case and claimed that he used it as a “placeholder” in a draft. DE [70-1]. It is implausible that an attorney would cite a case as specific as “Green v. John H. Streater, Jr., 666 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1981)” – which Krupnick admits does not exist – as a “placeholder” that he intended to replace. This is particularly true here, as Plaintiff had already cited the case that he subsequently claimed he intended to use. See DE [69-1] at 3 (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)). Although Krupnick's conduct raises questions of his adherence to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (as he himself concedes), given the Court's recommendation that Rutella's motion to vacate be denied, the Court declines to recommend further action with respect to Rutella's misleading submission. "

"Regardless of whatever resources are used to prepare a party’s brief, every attorney has an ongoing responsibility to review and ensure the accuracy of filings with this and other courts. This includes checking that all case law cited in a brief actually exists and supports the points being made. It is never acceptable to rely on software or technology—no matter how advanced—without reviewing and verifying the information. The use of AI or other technology does not excuse carelessness or failure to follow professional standards.

Technology can be helpful, but it cannot replace a lawyer’s judgment, research, or ethical responsibilities. The practice of law changes with the use of new technology, but the core duties of competence and candor remain the same. Lawyers must adapt to new tools without lowering their standards."

The second respondent, Carly Dakota Wise, a self-represented litigant, filed an application for the recusal of a tribunal member, alleging bias and procedural unfairness. The application was based on several grounds, including fabricated legal citations - despite Ms. Wise having been warned in interlocutory proceedings to check the authorities she relied on. The court cited the local Guidelines for the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) Guidelines for Responsible Use by Non-Lawyers, available here, to stress that self-represented litigants need to check the accuracy of their pleadings.

" Plaintiffs identify fictitious quotes and citations in their briefing to support their arguments. For example, Plaintiffs purport to quote language from S.H. Hold v. United States, 853 F.3d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 2017) and Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 2011). (Reed 2, Dkt. No. 23 at 6.) However, the quoted language is nowhere found in those cases. Plaintiffs also cite to a case identified as “Horne v. Potter, 557 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2009).” (Id. at 7.) That citation, however, is for a case titled Bell v. The Hershey Company. Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge they offered fictitious citations. (See Reed 2, Dkt. No. 27.) Plaintiffs are cautioned that providing fictitious cases and quotes will lead to sanctions. "

In this rebuttal, the lawyer cited jurisprudence that the presiding judge (Relator) found to be "impressively so delineated and harmonious with the case". This prompted the judge to investigate the precedent more closely. He discovered that while the case number indicated was real, it belonged to a completely different case unrelated to the legal matter being discussed, leading to the suspicion of an AI "hallucination.

The court concluded:

"It is totally inconceivable to imagine that the Judiciary, already so burdened with countless lawsuits, needs to investigate all the case law set forth in the legal grounds reported by the parties in the procedural documents, despite the duty to act in good faith set forth in Article 5 of the CPC. After all, it is entirely based on the principle of trust expectation that all subjects act in accordance with existing and valid rules.

Thus, even if the appellant claims that such conduct was the result of an error, a claim that has not been satisfactorily proven, but which is taken as a premise for the purposes of argumentation, in the present case, it would be, at the very least, an inexcusable, gross error resulting from serious misconduct, ruling out the possibility of proceeding without any implications in this judicial field, so as not to allow any hesitation in considering the aforementioned conduct as being clearly litigious in bad faith.

Thus, as a result of having acted in a manifestly reckless manner (Art. 80, V of the CPC), I condemn the appellant for litigation in bad faith, and he must pay the fine set at 1% of the value of the case (Art. 81 of the CPC), in accordance with the grounds"

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

The appellant, a lawyer representing himself in an appeal, submitted a brief that included non-existent legal citations. An employee in the lawyer's office had used an AI system to assist in drafting the document. After the opposing counsel and the court itself were unable to locate the cited precedents, the lawyer admitted they were AI-generated and a "good-faith mistake" for which he took full responsibility. While citing its authority to dismiss the appeal entirely due to the submission of non-existent sources, the court chose a "softer" sanction. It proceeded to hear the case, ultimately dismissing the appeal on its merits and imposing a separate monetary penalty payable to the State Treasury for the misconduct.

This judgment, delivered on 6 June 2025 by the Divisional Court of the King's Bench Division, addresses two cases referred under the court's Hamid jurisdiction, which concerns the court's power to enforce duties lawyers owe to the court. Both cases involve lawyers submitting written arguments or evidence containing false information, specifically non-existent case citations, generated through the use of artificial intelligence without proper verification.

The Court used this opportunity to issue broader guidance on the use of AI in legal practice, raising concerns about the competence, training, and supervision of lawyers.

" This Court's local rules permit the use of generative artificial intelligence programs, but all parties, including pro se parties, must certify “that to the extent such a program was used, a human signatory of the document verified the accuracy of all generated text, including all citations and legal authority,” NECivR 7.1(d)(4)(B). The plaintiff's brief contains no such certification, nor does the plaintiff deny using artificial intelligence. See filing 27 at 9.
From the Court's review of the plaintiff's brief, most citations are not hallucinatory. But the plaintiff undeniably cites to cases that do not support the stated legal proposition. For example, the plaintiff asserts that “courts must ‘accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true.’ ” Filing 22 at 3. He attributes the quoted language to Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009). The quote is a boilerplate recitation of the standard on a motion to dismiss, and any number of cases contain that exact language—but not Braden, the case to which the plaintiff attributed the quote.

The plaintiff characterizes the mismatched citations as “[t]ypographical errors or minor misstatements.” Filing 27 at 9. That may be true for some of the mistakes—for example, the case Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) is correctly cited, and it immediately precedes a citation for the nonexistent “Foman v. Arnold,” which might be explained as a typographical error. See filing 22 at 13. But not all the mistakes are so innocent, such as the plaintiff's citation to the nonexistent “Brown v. Maple Tree Homes, Inc.,” purported to be a Nebraska case, the citation to which directs to a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. Filing 22 at 12. This mistake resembles the hallucinatory citations seen in other cases, and is a mistake the plaintiff had an obligation to correct before filing his brief. See Strong v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 8:24-cv-352, 2025 WL 100904, at *6 (D. Neb. Jan. 15, 2025).

The plaintiff also asserts that while the citations may be erroneous, the statements of law are not. The Court agrees that the plaintiff made no substantive misrepresentations of law, so striking the brief is not the appropriate remedy. However, the plaintiff should take notice of the fact that such conduct, if repeated, could subject him to sanctions, even as a pro se litigant. See Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 3:24-cv-304, 2025 WL 1122235, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2025); Rubio v. D.C., No. 23-cv-719, 2024 WL 4957373, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2024); Vargas v. Salazar, No. 4:23-CV-4267, 2024 WL 4804091, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2024); Martin v. Hawai‘i, No. 24-cv-294, 2024 WL 3877013, at *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 20, 2024)."

Court noted that Counsel was still citing fabricated authorities, even though show cause proceedings are ongoing in parallel.

"The pervasive misrepresentations of the law in Lucas' filings cannot be tolerated. It serves to make a mockery of the judicial process. It causes an enormous waste of judicial resources to try to find cited cases that do not exist and to determine whether a cited authority is relevant or binding, only to determine that most are neither.

In like fashion, Lucas' adversaries also must run to ground the nonexistent cases or address patently irrelevant ones. The adversaries must thus incur needless legal fees and expenses caused by Lucas' pervasive citations to nonexistent or irrelevant cases.

[...]

However, as previously noted Lucas appears to be judgment proof so monetary sanctions likely will not deter her from the abusive practices reflected in her filings and in her previously announced, consistently followed, abuse of the litigation proceedings created by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”). So, the Court must find some other way to protect the interests of justice and to deter Lucas from the abuses which have come to mark her approach to participation as a defendant in the judicial process.

In this case, the most appropriate remedy is to strike Lucas' filings where they are burdensome by virtue of volume and exceed permitted page limits, where they are not cogent or understandable (when given the generous latitude afforded pro se litigants), and where they misrepresent the law by citing nonexistent or utterly irrelevant cases."

In a subsequent Opinion, the court declined to reconsider or review its findings, pointing out that:

"To begin, it is unclear what Lucas means by "contested" citations. The citations that the Court found to not exist are not "contested." They simply do not exist. There is no contesting that fact because the Court checked each citation that was referenced in its MEMORANDUM OPINION, exactly as Lucas cited them (and through other research means), and could not find any citation that matched what Lucas cited. That research demonstrates that the Court's

findings are, in fact, supported rather than "[u]nsupported." Id.

Then, in no way did the Court "wrongly assume[]" that these citations to nonexistent legal authority were "'fabricated' due to the use of generative AI." Id. The Court meticulously checked every citation that it held did not exist in those decisions. Those decisions were not based on "assumptions" but, instead, on the fact that either (1) no case existed under the reporter citation, case name, or quotation that Lucas used, or (2) a case with the reporter citation did exist but was to an entirely different case than the one cited by Lucas and had no relevancy to the issues of this case. ECF No. 170, at 520. And, there was no incorrect assumption that those nonexistent legal authorities were generated, hallucinated, or fabricated by AI because Lucas admitted, on the record, to using AI when writing her filings with the Court. The fact that her citations to nonexistent legal authority are so pervasive, in volume and in location throughout her filings, can lead to only one plausible conclusion: that an AI program hallucinated them in an effort to meet whatever Lucas' desired outcome was based on the prompt that she put into the AI program. As the Court described in its MEMORANDUM OPINION, this is becoming an alarmingly prevalent occurrence common

to AI programs. Id. at 23-26. It is exceedingly clear that it occurred here.

[...]

The MOTION also complains that the Court did not give Lucas an "opportunity to verify or correct citations." Id.

Wholly apart from the fact that it is the litigant's (pro se or represented) burden to verify citations, there is no reason to have accorded Lucas the opportunity to verify because the problem was extensive and pervasive across at least six filings. Moreover, the Court actually did what should have been done before the MOTION was filed by determining that those citations do not exist. No further verification is necessary. And, after a diligent search, if the Court could not find the legal authorities that Lucas purported to rely upon and present as real and binding, it is a folly to believe that Lucas' efforts at "correction" would have returned anything different. Further, she could have taken the opportunity in this MOTION to go through—citation by citation—and "verify" or "correct" them to demonstrate to the Court that its findings were, in fact, incorrect, rather than just baldly and without evidence claiming them to be so. She did not do that."

The Complainant, who was self-represented, used artificial intelligence to assist in preparing her submissions, which included fictitious case citations. The Commission noted the potential seriousness of relying on fabricated citations but did not impose any sanctions on the Complainant, as she was self-represented. The judge held:

"In relation to the issue of the Complainant's reference to what appears to be fictitious case authorities, this is potentially a serious matter because it can be viewed as an attempt to mislead the Commission. If an admitted legal practitioner were to do this, there would be grounds to refer the practitioner to the Legal Services Commission for an allegation of misconduct.

[...]

Given that the Complainant is self-represented, I intend to take the same approach that I adopted in Goodchild and simply afford that part of the Complainant's submissions that deals with the two authorities no weight in determining the two applications. "

" Directing the Court to nonexistent authorities wastes the Court’s time, a resource meant to serve the public, not be monopolized by a single litigant making baseless arguments. "